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This article critiques key proposals of the United Kingdom’s “Online Harms” 
White Paper; in particular, the proposal for new digital regulator and the impo-
sition of a “duty of care” on platforms. While acknowledging that a duty of care, 
backed up by sanctions works well in some environments, we argue is not appro-
priate for policing the White Paper’s identified harms as it could result in the block-
ing of legal, subjectively harmful content. Furthermore, the proposed regulator 
lacks the necessary independence and could be subjected to political interference. 
We conclude that the imposition of a duty of care will result in an unacceptable 
chilling effect on free expression, resulting in a draconian regulatory environment 
for platforms, with users’ digital rights adversely affected.
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to operate”6 or attaching personal liability to directors7). Rather than 
using the courts or other legitimate democratic institutions, plat-
forms are obliged to determine and assess the harmfulness of user 
behavior before-and-after content is generated by users. The “duty of 
care” and the imposition of liability will change platforms and social 
media from a safe space for exercising fundamental speech rights to 
one where the state forces platforms to regulate content and decide 
what actions could be harmful. 
However, the White Paper’s “world-leading package of safety meas-
ures”8 leaves important terms undefined, empowering politicians of 
the day to force platforms to respond to harms where there is little 
evidence to support its dangers. Based on a statutory duty of care 
to prevent users from harm, platforms will be forced to monitor, 
moderate, and remove user-generated content under the threat of 
“substantial fines”.9  As tight compliance deadlines strongly incentiv-
ize online service providers to comply with complaints swiftly, there 
is ample evidence from takedown regimes that platforms err on the 
side of caution, regardless of the actual merits of the claims.10 The 
proposal also “empowers users” to hold platforms to account for 
failing to live up to their duty of care.11 Fortunately, for people who 
care about the value of public discourse and are willing to resist the 
moral panic about the dangers of unregulated platforms, the White 
Paper should unite a disparate crew of civil society groups, desperate 
for a cause to rally behind since the Digital Economy Act 2010, the 
6 Online Harms White Paper (n 1) 60 ¶ 6.5.
7 Idem. 
8 Online Harms White Paper (n 1).
9 Online Harms White Paper (n 1) 59 § 6.
10 Hosting Intermediary Services and Illegal Content Online, Inst. for Info. 
L. (2018), https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/hosting_intermedi-
ary_services.pdf.
11 Online Harms White Paper (n 1) 10 §16-18.
1. Introduction
In April 2019, the UK Government’s Department of Digital, Culture, 
Media and Sport (“DCMS”) released its White Paper for “Online 
Harms” which, if accepted, would impose a new duty of care standard 
for online platform users to be overseen by an independent regulator.1 
If the White Paper proposals are brought into force, a regulator will be 
empowered to decide what activities and content are deemed harmful 
to Internet users.2 After making this determination, the regulator can 
mandate intervention by internet providers to protect users from 
these harms.3 If the recommendations in the DCMS White Paper are 
enacted into law, the UK could soon have a new Internet regulator 
(provisionally referred to as “OfWeb”4) that will have the statutory 
obligation of imposing a duty of care on online services to prevent a 
series of yet-to-be defined “online harms.”5 It moves enforcement of 
laws regulating content and free speech from courts and passes the 
obligation to private actors like Facebook, Google, and Twitter under 
the threat of penalties for non-compliance (possibly a loss of “license 
1 Online Harms White Paper, Gov.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/
consultations/online-harms-white-paper (last updated Feb. 12, 2020) [here-
inafter Online Harms White Paper].
2 Online Harms White Paper (n 1) ¶ 2.2 and  ¶ 5.15.
3 Idem at ¶  6.5.
4 Akin to Ofcom (The Office of Communications), broadcast and telecoms 
regulator, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/home, It is imagined that the office 
of the web’ would be a newly created regulator named Ofweb.
5 Online Harms White Paper (n 1) 7 §- 
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SOPA12/ACTA13 protests of 201214, and Articles 10 and 17 of the new 
Copyright Directive.15 The DCMS intervention might just also help the 
typical citizen understand why Article 10 of the European Convention 
of Human Rights16 is so important to the functioning of our modern 
society and end the present cycle of everything on the Internet is 
bad. With free expression at the heart of Western concepts like the 
marketplace of ideas, democratic deliberation, and the media’s role in 
holding power to account, the challenge of any regulatory intervention 
online is targeting the effort at the right people, the legitimacy of the 
intervention, the proportionality of the measure and the effectiveness 
of steps taken, while ensuring media pluralism and the protection of 
low-level speech.17
This Article provides a brief overview of the events and the numerous 
hearings and interventions by the UK Parliament and the Govern-
ment that led to the production of the White Paper. The Article then 
critiques the “duty of care” proposed in the White Paper, concluding 
that the imposition of a duty will chill free speech. The next section 
focuses on the role and independence of the proposed regulator, 
“OfWeb.” This is followed by a critique of the harms identified by the 
Department of Culture, Media and Sport as justification for the duty 
of care. The Article concludes with recommendations and next steps.
2 The Bureaucratic Responses
The White Paper mirrors large parts of the output from the House 
of Lords’ Communication Committee Report18 and a previous report 
from the House of Commons DCMS Committee titled “Disinforma-
tion and ‘fake news’: Final Report”19: an amalgamation, in part, of 
what special interest groups believe is in the best interests of their 
members, rather than the wider digital community at large. The 
White Paper relies heavily on evidence from NGOs and charities like 
Doteveryone, the Children’s Commissioner, Internet Matters, and Girl 
Guiding.20 Upon reading the evidence submitted, one could easily 
conclude that the digital environment remains extremely hazardous 
and generally unsafe. On the contrary, the public generally believes 
the Internet is a good thing. In Ofcom’s examination of online users, 
59% of adults said the benefits outweigh the risks. Only a small 
percentage said the opposite. Furthermore, 61% of children said the 
Internet makes their lives better.21 So where does this nuanced vision 
12 https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/3261/text
13 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX-
:52010IP0432&from=GA. 
14 The US Congress debated two bills (Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) was 
designed to protect the copyright creative industries. The bills were ulti-
mately rejected after unprecedented protests and complaints to American 
representatives and Senators. The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA) protests flared in Europe out of the belief that the openness of the 
Internet would be compromised.
15 Council Directive (EU) 2019/790, 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92 (EC).
16 The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms was opened for signature in Rome on 4 November 1950 and 
came into force on 3 September 1953. As of 16 May 2018, it counts 47 
States parties.
17 Jacob Rowbottom, To Rant, Vent and Converse: Protecting Low Level Digi-
tal Speech, 71 Cambridge L.J. 355, (2 Apr. 2012).
18 Regulating in a digital world: Final report published, House of Lords Com-
munication Committee (9 Mar. 2019), https://www.parliament.uk/busi-
ness/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/communications-commit-
tee/inquiries/parliament-2017/the-internet-to-regulate-or-not-to-regulate/. 
19 Disinformation and ‘fake news’: Final Report published, House of Com-
mons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee (14 Feb. 2019), https://
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/1791.
pdf.
20 Online Harms White Paper (n 1). 
21 Online Nation, Ofcom 3 (30 May 2019) https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/
assets/pdf_file/0025/149146/online-nation-report.pdf 141.
come from? 
After the Cambridge Analytica scandal,22 a series of hearings across 
a wide range of UK government entities were launched into the role 
of platforms in everything from disrupting democracy to causing 
long-term harm to children, facilitating abusive content.23 The general 
consensus was that “something must be done.”24 Ironically, those 
same Members of Parliament (MPs) took to platforms to publicize 
how their plan was going to make the Internet safe again. The White 
Paper follows the Government’s proposals set out in the Internet 
Safety Strategy Green Paper from October 201725 and the Digital 
Charter from January 2018.26 The key principles for future regulation 
are parity (“what is unacceptable offline should be unacceptable 
online”), openness, transparency, the protection of human rights, and 
the protection of children.27 In February 2019, the House of Commons 
DCMS Committee published their report, “Disinformation and ‘Fake 
News’,”28 calling for government action to curtail the dissemination 
of deceptive content.29 The White Paper goes even further, including 
disinformation within the list of harms that platforms will be under a 
duty of care to prevent.30
The Government and both Houses of Parliament agreed that there 
needs to be extensive regulation of the Internet and, in particular, 
social media.31 To justify the need for intervention, they cite everything 
from issues with political advertising32 (in particular, the UK’s referen-
dum on the Continued Membership of the European Union (Brexit)), 
to fake news and online manipulation,33 data breaches by the tech 
giants,34 the lack of competition in the Internet’s mainstream (social 
22 The Cambridge Analytica files, (The Guardian) https://www.theguardian.
com/news/series/cambridge-analytica-files (last accessed 6 May 2019).
23 See ICO issues maximum £500,000 fine to Facebook for failing to protect 
users’ personal information, Info. Commissioner’s Off. (25 Oct. 2018), 
https://ico.org.uk/facebook-fine-20181025; House of Commons Digital, 
Culture, Media and Sport Committee, (n 19); Addressing harmful online 
content, Ofcom (18 Sept. 2018), https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/
pdf_file/0022/120991/Addressing-harmful-online-content.pdf; Govern-
ment response to the Internet Safety Strategy Green Paper, HM Govern-
ment (May 2018), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/708873/Government_Re-
sponse_to_the_Internet_Safety_Strategy_Green_Paper_-_Final.pdf. 
24 Sonia Livingstone, Rethinking the rights of children for the Internet Age, 
Available at https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/parenting4digitalfuture/2019/04/03/re-
thinking-the-rights-of-children-for-the-internet-age/ (last accessed 25 April 
2019).
25 HM Government, Internet Safety Strategy – Green paper, October 2017, 
Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/650949/Internet_Safe-
ty_Strategy_green_paper.pdf (last accessed 6 May 2019).
26 Digital Charter, Gov.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
digital-charter (last accessed 8 Apr. 2019).
27 Ibid. 
28 House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee (n 19).
29 (n 19) 64.
30 Online Harms White Paper (n 1) 31
31 Online Harms White Paper (n 1); House of Lords Communication Com-
mittee (n 18) and House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee (n 19). 
32 Online Harms White Paper (n 1) 28-29. See also Vote Leave’s targeted 
Brexit ads released by Facebook, (BBC News, 26 July 26 2018), https://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-44966969.
33 Online Harms White Paper (n 1) 22-23. See Articles on Fake news, The 
Conversation, https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/fake-news-33438 
(last accessed 30 May 2019).
34 Idem at 31-32; see generally Sam Schechner & Mark Secada, You Give Apps 
Sensitive Personal Information. Then They Tell Facebook, (Wall St. J., 22 
Feb. 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/you-give-apps-sensitive-person-
al-information-then-they-tell-facebook-11550851636.
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the DCMS’s promises and passion for new regulation, it is unlikely 
that the submissions substantially alter the proposal, no matter how 
well-evidenced and reasonable.
The White Paper is the latest in a long line of government reports and 
policy documents emanating from, among others, the controversy 
surrounding the vote on the United Kingdom’s continued member-
ship in the European Union (Brexit) and concerns about Russian 
interference in democratic discourse. The DCMS White Paper is the 
latest of these reports and focuses on the identification of “online 
harms” that are then used to justify the creation of a new regulator 
for Internet platforms. The harms are linked to and supported by 
evidence and reports filed by a large number of civil society groups, 
NGOs, charities, and child protection advocates.49 The DCMS White 
Paper argues that these online harms are severe enough to warrant 
new and Internet-specific regulation. It also claims to reflect the 
changing tide in the way the government and society think about the 
Internet. 
Despite numerous laws already in place to tackle some of the iden-
tified harms and numerous laws regulating content, actions, and 
behavior,50 the White Paper attempts to pass the government’s own 
policing responsibilities onto platforms; in other words, “it is your 
platform, you have to deal with it”. The ethos of the White Paper is 
simple: platforms are seen as public spaces and are no different from 
theme parks, offices, and restaurants. Risk-based legal regimes like 
the UK’s Health and Safety Act and the EU’s General Data Protection 
Regulation have successfully deployed a duty of care before; therefore, 
as Facebook et al. are places where people gather, the imposition of a 
duty of care will work between platforms and users too. As we discuss 
in the next section, there are fundamental flaws with this argument.
3 How a Duty of Care Will Chill Free Speech
A duty of care normally carries with it a “three-stage test of foreseea-
bility, proximity, and policy.”51 Foreseeability and proximity involve an 
examination of the factual circumstances of the parties.52 Policy con-
siderations usually require the court to deploy foresight into the con-
sequences for other parties, not part of the dispute. The test requires 
the court to determine whether there is a legal relationship between 
the parties of the dispute;53 for example, does an employer have a 
duty of care to its employees? Does a business have a duty of care to 
its customers? Does a building site operator have a duty of care to 
its visitors? A legal requirement to keep a place safe not only makes 
sense, but also puts prevention at the heart of the legal regime. Sec-
ondly, one of the central purposes of a duty of care is to apply similar 
duties to similar facts.54 Once a court establishes that a duty of care is 
owed between x and y in circumstances z, then that decision applies 
to all future cases of the same kind. Of course, this duty will then 
be foreseeable and more certain, and not vague as suggested in the 
White Paper, both in terms of harms and individuals owed to.
risks right to privacy and free expression, Article 19 (19 June 2018), https://
www.article19.org/resources/uk-more-regulation-of-content-online-risks-
rights- to-privacy-and-free-expression/.
49 Examples include reports cited in the Online Harms White Paper (n 1) 13 – 
14.
50 Abusive and Offensive Online Communications: A Scoping Report, L. Com-
mission at 66-96 (1 Nov. 2018), https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/
lawcom-prod-storage- 11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2018/10/6_5039_LC_On-
line_Comms_Report_FINAL_291018_WEB.pdf.
51 Caparo Industries v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL).
52 Ibid per Lord Roskill at 629 - 627
53 Ibid per Lord Oliver of Aylmerton at 632 - 634
54 Ibid at 618 – 619 per Lord Bridge of Harwich; Brennan J. in the High Court 
of Australia in Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman (1985) 60 A.L.R. 1, 43–44.
networking, search engines, advertising),35 child abuse36 and harms to 
children (including self-harm threats),37 terrorist and extremist con-
tent,38 and even knife crime.39 The Committee expressed confidence 
that their proposal will address all of these issues, regardless of how 
different their causes and consequences.40
The White Paper recommends establishing a new independent 
regulator for the Internet41 and the adoption of a co-regulatory model 
similar to broadcast regulation,42 despite the fact that wireless inter-
net is transmitted in a similar manner to the broadcasting signal, 
the Internet has almost zero resemblance to broadcasting. The new 
“OfWeb” will draft codes of conduct that set out principles of online 
safety and the “duty of care,”43 backed up by reporting requirements 
and effective enforcement powers.44 The regulator will also have 
responsibilities to promote education and awareness-raising about 
online safety, take a risk-based approach, ‘prioritising action to tackle 
activity or content where there is the greatest evidence or threat 
of harm, or where children or other vulnerable users are at risk.’45 
Additionally, the regulator will be tasked to safeguard innovation, and 
to protect digital rights, ‘being particularly mindful to not infringe pri-
vacy and freedom of expression.’46 This regulatory effort actually goes 
hand-in-hand with what Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg recently 
proposed in his regulatory vision for Facebook.47 Understandably, 
the proposal has attracted opposition and warnings from civil society 
groups, human rights advocates, lawyers, and academics.48 Given 
35 Online Harms White Paper (n 1) 27-28; Matt Binder, Google hit with $1.7 
billion fine for anticompetitive ad practices, (Mashable, 20 Mar.  2019), 
https://mashable.com/article/google-eu-antitrust-fine-ads/.
36 Online Harms White Paper (n 1) 50; Jamie Grierson, Met police ‘over-
whelmed’ by surge in online child sexual abuse, (The Guardian, 28 Mar. 
2019), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/mar/28/london- met-
ropolitan-police-overwhelmed-by-surge-in-online-child-sexual-abuse-watch-
dog-finds.
37 Online Harms White Paper (n 1) 19; Sarah Marsh & Jim Waterson, Ins-
tagram bans ‘graphic’ self-harm images after Molly Russell’s death, (The 
Guardian, 7 Feb. 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/
feb/07/instagram-bans-graphic-self-harm-images- after-molly-rus-
sells-death.
38 Online Harms White Paper (n 1) 14; Preventing the dissemination of terror-
ist content online, European Parliament (Sept. 2018), http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/legislative- train/theme-area-of-justice-and-fundamental-rights/
file-preventing-the-dissemination-of-terrorist-content-online.
39 Online Harms White Paper (n 1) 13. The report implies that online content 
allegedly glorifies gangs, and has led to an increase in knife crimes (the 
Report cites ONS (2019). Crime in England and Wales, Year Ending 
September 2018. Available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/ peoplepopula-
tionandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulletins/crimeinenglandandwales/
yearendingseptember2018). This is unsupported and the causation/cor-
relation is vague. See generally Knife Crime, (The Guardian), https://www.
theguardian.com/uk/knifecrime (last accessed 31 May 2019).
40 Online Harms White Paper (n 1) 11–41.
41 Idem at 57 (OfWeb is the suggested name. However, the paper suggests 
Ofcom may initially be given the task.).
42 Idem.
43 William Perrin & Lorna Woods, Reducing harm in social media through a 
duty of care, CarnegieUK Trust (8 May 2018), https://www.carnegieuktrust.
org.uk/blog/reducing-harm-social-media-duty-care/.
44 Online Harms White Paper (n 1) Section 7.42 and 6. 
45 Ibid, p. 53. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Regulating in a Digital World, House of Lords Select Committee on Comm. 
(9 Mar. 2019), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/
ldcomuni/299/29902.htm.
48 See, e.g., PI’s take on the UK government’s new proposal to tackle “online 
harms”, Privacy Int’l (8 Apr. 2019), https://privacyinternational.org/
news/2779/pis-take-uk-governments-new-proposal-tackle-online-harms; 
Jim Killock & Amy Shepherd, The DCMS Online Harms Strategy must 
“design in” fundamental rights, Online Rts. Group (8 Apr. 2019), https://
www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2019/the-dcms-online-harms-strategy-
must-design-in-fundamental-rights; UK: More regulation of content online 
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associated with content ex post is fundamentally different from the 
imposition of a duty of care on platforms for the uncertainty that users 
may generate content that causes harm. Risk can be accounted and 
modelled for and quantified through pricing strategies, while uncer-
tainty is a risk than cannot be measured. Its reliance on the evidence 
of numerous NGOs, charities, consumer protection groups, and 
other advocates informs us of numerous types of harms62, but none 
can predict when or how these harms will take place. 
The imposition of a duty of care backed by financial sanctions onto 
platforms, spins both the uncertainty about the frequency and the 
likelihood and validity of the harms themselves into the risk of harms 
associated with user-generated content. Once this occurs, risk can be 
modelled and priced. This is a dangerous path leading to a chilling 
effect on permitted content. First, are the unknowns. As Douglas 
Adams writes in the Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy, “the major 
difference between a thing that might go wrong and that thing that 
cannot possibly go wrong is that when a thing that cannot possibly go 
wrong goes wrong, it usually turns out to be impossible to get at or 
repair.”63 Second, once something is priced, the imposition of a duty 
of care establishes a transaction cost for content; speech deemed 
too costly to the platform will be filtered, blocked and/or removed ex 
ante rather than ex post, especially when the uncertainty surrounding 
content is determined to have too high a transaction cost, regardless 
of its actual risk. In other domains, where one sees the imposition of 
a duty of care (i.e.  environmental law64 or health and safety65), the 
law serves to mitigate the distribution costs of uncertainty through 
legal conventions like the precautionary principle66 or the preventative 
measures rule.67 Prentice-Dunn & Rogers argue that preventative 
regimes operate best when it is possible to predict outcomes that are 
contrary to totally rational decision making.68 But regulating speech 
through precaution or prevention is a disproportionate response to 
the various forms of uncertainty. An online harm may come about 
from one or more causes, and if it occurs, one or more effects. In 
isolation, an innocuous comment may cause little harm, but the 
cumulative effect might cause substantial harm. 
The duty of care would require platforms to avoid content that would 
place them at fault for a list of harms. In practice, this means that 
platforms would be under a statutory obligation to take reasonable 
care. If there was no duty of care to prevent a certain harm; in these 
circumstances, the law would permit platforms to act unreasonably. 
Yet, cases in English law about duty of care are limited to whether 
62 Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport and UK Council for Internet 
Safety, Online harms research publications, Available at https://www.
gov.uk/government/collections/online-harms-research-publications (last 
accessed 3 Sept 2019). 
63 Douglas Adams (2000), Mostly Harmless (New York: Del Rey). 
64 At the European level, the precautionary principle was enshrined in the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992. It is now included in Article 191 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union among the principles underpinning 
EU environmental policy. 
65 The Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974; See also Management of 
Health and Safety at Work Regulations (MHSWR) 1999. 
66 M.D. Rogers. Scientific and technological uncertainty, the precaution-
ary principle, scenarios and risk management. Journal of Risk Research, 
4(1):1–15, 2001; See also doteveryone, “A digital duty of care”, Available 
at https://doteveryone.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Dotevery-
one-briefing-a-digital-duty-of-care.pdf (last accessed 3 September 2019).
67 Niskanen, T., Naumanen, P., & Hirvonen, M. L. (2012). An evaluation of 
EU legislation concerning risk assessment and preventive measures in 
occupational safety and health. Applied ergonomics, 43(5), 829-842.
68 Prentice-Dunn, S., & Rogers, R. W. (1986). Protection motivation theory 
and preventive health: Beyond the health belief model. Health Education 
Research. I(3), 153-161.
Applying a duty of care between platforms and users to speech, how-
ever, will require platforms to block entire categories of speech, based 
on a legal obligation to block specific kinds of harm in the future. 
Cyber-bullying might cause individualized harms, but another user 
might not view others’ comments as bullying. Trolling and swearing, 
for example, might be completely unacceptable to one person, but 
acceptable to another. Trolling is purely subjective speech that may, 
on occasion, rise to the threshold of criminal speech. An example 
would be grossly offensive, obscene, indecent or menacing communi-
cations regulated by s. 127 of the Communications Act 2003. Trolling 
that does not pass this threshold, would not be considered criminal 
now. For this reason, there are no laws regulating this kind of speech 
or content wherein the legal test of harm or offence is subjective 
and a recipient of speech/content gets to be the sole determinant 
of whether something causes harm.55 In a recent high-profile event, 
a columnist for the New York Times accused an academic of abuse 
for referring to him as a “metaphorical bedbug”.56 The DCMS report 
offers no guidance about how platforms should police metaphors.
In the UK, the test required before criminal charges will be brought 
against content posted on social media is one of such gross offen-
siveness that criminal charges should be brought.57 After several 
controversial and high-profile prosecutions,58 the Public Prosecutor 
issued guidelines for the prosecution of grossly offensive speech.59 
These limit prosecutions under Section 127 of the Communications 
Act 2003 to cases which go beyond those which are “[o]ffensive, 
shocking or disturbing; or [s]atirical, iconoclastic or rude; or [t]he 
expression of unpopular; or unfashionable opinion about serious 
or trivial matters, or banter or humor, even if distasteful to some or 
painful to those subjected to it.”60 The threshold for bringing criminal 
charges is high, yet the DCMS bases their report on broad categories 
of speech that does not come close to the threshold of criminality. 
One of the challenges of regulating content is differentiating between 
the risk of harm and the uncertainty that the harm may or may 
not occur.61 Imposing a duty of care on platforms to tackle harms 
55 Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 should be interpreted as an 
objective test. Would a reasonable person view the communication as 
‘grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character’.
56 @davekarpf, Twitter (26 Aug. 2019, 2:07 PM), https://twitter.com/daveka-
rpf/status/1166094950024515584. See Allan Smith, A professor labeled 
Bret Stephens a ‘bedbug.’ Here’s what the NYT columnist did next, (NBC 
News, 27 Aug. 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/
professor-labeled-bret-stephens-bedbug-here-s-what-nyt-column-
ist-n1046736.
57 Communications Act 2003, c. 21, § 127 (UK). 
58 Chambers v Director of Public Prosecutions [2012] EWHC 2157 (PC). See also 
Azhar Ahmed Sentencing Remarks, Available at https://www.judiciary.
uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Judgments/azhar-ahmed-sen-
tencing-remarks-09102012.pdf (last accessed 12 Sept 2019); “Man who 
racially abused Stan Collymore on Twitter spared prison”, (The Guardian, 
21 Mar 2012), Available at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/
mar/21/man-racially-abused-collymore-twitter-spared-prison (last accessed 
11 Sept 2019). 
59 Director of Public Prosecutions, “Social Media - Guidelines on prosecuting 
cases involving communications sent via social media”, Revised: 21 August 
2018, Available at: https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/social-me-
dia-guidelines-prosecuting-cases-involving-communications-sent-so-
cial-media (last accessed 23 March 2020). 
60 Director of Public Prosecutions, “Interim guidelines on prosecuting cases 
involving communications sent via social media”, Available at https://
adam1cor.files.wordpress.com/2012/12/117342720-social-media-dpp.pdf, 
(last accessed 12 September 2019). 
61 For a detailed explanation on the difference between risk and uncertainty, 
see Volz, K. G., & Gigerenzer, G. (2012). Cognitive processes in decisions 
under risk are not the same as in decisions under uncertainty. Frontiers in 
Neuroscience, 6, 105.
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harmful, including academic articles that criticize OfWeb’s approach 
for its chilling effect on free expression.
The White Paper identifies twenty-three harms in total.81 Some of 
them are already criminal offenses, others are so vague it would be 
a regulatory achievement for OfWeb to come up with a definition 
that sounds good in theory, but also works in practice. The DCMS 
report categorizes these harms in three groups: harms with a clear 
definition; harms with a less clear definition and underage exposure 
to legal content.82 In the table below, we provide an overview of all the 
harms included in these three groups, referring to their current legal 
status, i.e. whether some of them are already a criminal offence, of 
their status is less clear from the perspective of the current laws.  
Table 1 Harms with a Clear Definition83
Group 1: 
Harms with a Clear 
Definition
Status Criminal Law Provision
Child sexual exploitation 
and abuse 
Criminal Offense
Sections 47-51 of the Sexual Offences Act 
2003.
Terrorist content and 
activity
Criminal Offense
Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000; Sec-
tion 3 of the Counter-Terrorism and Border 
Security Act 2019.
Organized immigration 
crime
Criminal Offense
Modern Slavery Act 2015; Section 1 of the 
Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of 
Claimants, etc.) Act 2004; Sections 57 to 59 
of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. 
Modern slavery Criminal Offense Modern Slavery Act 2015.
Extreme pornography Criminal Offense
Section 63 of the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 2008.
Revenge pornography Criminal Offense
Section 33 of the Criminal Justice and 
Courts Act 2015.
Harassment and cyber-
stalking
Criminal Offense
Section 2, 2A, 4, 4A, Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997; Section 1 Malicious 
Communications Act 1988.
Hate crime Criminal Offense
Public Order Act 1986; Racial and Religious 
Hatred Act 2006; Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 2008; Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994; For England, Wales, 
and Scotland, the Crime and Disorder Act 
1998 makes hateful behavior towards a vic-
tim based on the victim’s membership (or 
presumed membership) in a racial group 
an “aggravating factor” for the purpose of 
sentencing in respect of specified crimes. 
Sections 2, 2A, 4, 4A of the Protection 
from Harassment Act 1997 also apply for 
racially and religiously aggravated offences 
of harassment and stalking and putting 
people in fear of violence, and stalking 
involving fear of violence. Finally, there 
are communication offence under section 
127(1) of the Communications Act 2003, or 
section 1 of the Malicious Communications 
Act 1988, with enhanced sentencing due to 
hostility towards one of the five protected 
characteristics.
Encouraging or assisting 
suicide
Criminal Offense Section 2 and 2A of the Suicide Act 1961.
Incitement of violence Criminal Offense
Section 44, 45 of the Serious Crime Act 
2007.
Sale of illegal goods/ services 
such as drugs and weapons 
on the open internet
Criminal Offense
Section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977; 
Section 46 of the Serious Crime Act 2007; 
Fraud Act (2006), Misuse of Drugs Act 
(1971), or Firearms Act (1968).
Content illegally uploaded 
from prisons
Criminal Offense Section 40D(3A) Prison Act 1952.
Sexting of indecent images by 
under 18s
Criminal Offense Section 45 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
As seen in the table above, these harms are already illegal and there is 
no need to introduce entirely new laws for them. Some of them could 
benefit from further clarifications (e.g. terrorist content or harass-
81 Ibid, p. 31. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
the duty of care was applied properly and whether the party with 
the obligation acted reasonably.69 Most duties of care cases involve 
an examination of the application of vague concepts like “foreseea-
bility,” “proximity,” and “fair, just and reasonable.”70  The scope of 
the duty is unrelated to legal causation: should we limit the extent 
of the defendant’s responsibility for the harm despite the fact that 
the defendant’s fault was a but-for cause of the harm? It is difficult 
to contemplate that platforms, rather than user-generated content, 
is the but-for cause of harm, that can only be identified by a new 
regulator.   
4 Online Harm Offensive
The government defines “online harm” as “online content or activity 
that harms individual users, particularly children, or threatens our 
way of life in the UK, either by undermining national security or by 
reducing trust and undermining our shared rights, responsibilities 
and opportunities to foster integration.”71 The vague definition ironi-
cally refers to the UK’s “way of life” and “rights,” but the list of harms 
contradicts this proposition.  Having analyzed the White Paper,72 
the EDPS report on Online Manipulation,73 the High Level Working 
Group’s Report on Disinformation,74 the House of Lords’ Commu-
nication Committee Report on Regulating the Internet,75 and any of 
the hundred other reports into deceptive media online, one could 
be forgiven for thinking that “harms” are an invention of the World 
Wide Web. Although it is clear that the Internet’s architecture and 
scale make some harms easier to facilitate,76 it is also true that the 
diffusion of harms, especially within the context of communication, 
has always been a danger for society.
The White Paper’s framework aims to regulate harms “based on an 
assessment of their prevalence and impact on individuals and soci-
ety.”77  Rather than relying on compelling evidence, this is based on 
a handful of surveys and media reports, largely provided by a variety 
of outside groups with their own agendas.78 Even more troubling is 
the fact the list of harms is “by design, neither exhaustive nor fixed.”79  
This is justified by claiming that a “static list could prevent swift 
regulatory action to address new forms of online harm, new tech-
nologies, content and new online activities.”80 Consequently, in the 
right political climate, OfWeb could theoretically proclaim anything 
69 Key cases: Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562; Topp v London Country Bus 
[1993] 1 WLR 976; Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004.
70 Howarth, D. (2006). Many Duties of Care—Or a Duty of Care? Notes from 
the Underground. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 26(3), 449-472.
71 Online Harms White Paper (n 1) 30.
72 Online Harms White Paper (n 1).
73 EDPS Opinion on online manipulation and personal data, Opinion 3/2018, 
available at: https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-03-19_
online_manipulation_en.pdf. 
74 The final report “A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation” is avail-
able at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-
high-level-expert-group-fake-news-and-online-disinformation. 
75 House of Lords Communication Committee (n 18).
76 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1970 (2014), 
Internet and politics: the impact of new information and communication 
technology on democracy, Available at https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/
XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=20447&lang=en, Accessed 30 May 
2019.
77 Online Harms White Paper (n 1) 30.
78 Ofcom (2018). Adults’ Media Use and Attitudes Report. Available at:  
https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/113222/Adults-Me-
dia-Use-and-Attitudes-Report-2018.pdf Ofcom and ICO (2018). Internet us-
ers’ experience of harm online 2018. Available at: https://www.ofcom.org.
uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/120852/Internet-harm-research-2018-re-
port.pdf Accessed 6 May 2019.
79 Online Harms White Paper (n 1) 30.
80 Ibid.
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Violent content Vaguely defined and problem-
atic - any violent content online, 
including artistic speech could 
be harmful.
It is unclear how this is dif-
ferent from harassment, fear 
of violence, threat, stalking 
and extreme pornography, 
and other already existing 
criminal offences, as noted 
above. Does it include artistic 
speech, video games, films 
and what implication can this 
vaguely defined harm have on 
free speech?
Advocacy of self-harm Dangerous precedent, blurs the 
lines between free speech and 
‘advocacy’, as well as support 
self-harm support groups on 
social media.
Not illegal, but the UK gov-
ernment has threatened to 
introduce legislation if plat-
forms do not remove content 
promoting self-harm. The Law 
Commission notes “[publi-
cizing] or glorifying self-harm 
is not ostensibly criminal 
either.”88 However, offence of 
causing grievous bodily harm 
with intent, contrary to sec-
tion 18 of the Offences Against 
the Person Act 1861, could be 
used here, provided that the 
victim caused herself serious 
harm with intent, so assisting 
or encouraging such behavior 
could be guilty of an offence 
under sections 44 to 46 of the 
Serious Crime Act 2007.89
Promotion of female geni-
tal mutilation
Criminal Female Genital Mutilation Act 
2003 makes the Act illegal, but 
there is no offence relating to 
its promotion.  but see ss. 44 
- 46 of the Serious Crime Act, 
intentionally encouraging or 
assisting an offence; encour-
aging or assisting an offence 
believing it will be committed; 
and encouraging or assist-
ing offences believing one or 
more will be committed.90
the UK, see Disinformation and ‘fake news’: Interim Report, Report of 
the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee (2017-19) HC 363, 
available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/
cmcumeds/363/363.pdf. There are however civil remedies in defamation 
and media regulation. The ECHR in Salov v Ukraine (2007) 45 EHRR 51 
held that Article 10 does not prohibit discussion or dissemination of 
information received, even if it is strongly suspected that this information 
might not be truthful. The Court suggested that otherwise it would deprive 
persons of the right to express their views and opinions about statements 
made in the mass media, and would therefore place an unreasonable 
restriction on the freedom of expression. For a broader discussion see B 
McNair, Fake News Falsehood, Fabrication and Fantasy in Journalism, 
Routledge, 2018; T McGonagle, “‘Fake news’: False fears or real concerns?” 
(2017) 35(4) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 203
88 The Law Commission (n 84) ¶ 12.93, see also A Gillespie (2016), Cyber-
crime: Key Issues and Debates, Routledge, 200.  As the Commission also 
finds, online communications promoting self-harm would need to pass 
the threshold of “obscene, indecent or grossly offensive” to be prosecuted 
under section 127 of the CA 2003. If considered obscene, its publication 
may be prosecuted under section 2 of the Obscene Publications Act 1959. 
This would need to ensure compatibility with the Human Rights Act 1998, 
as both the Commission and Gilespie warn. See The Law Commission (n 
84) ¶ 12.95, or Gilespie ibid p. 201.
89 See Law Commission (n 84) ¶ 12.94. The Commission also questions the 
appropriateness of using criminal law in this context, ¶  12.99.
90 The Law Commission (n 84) ¶ 12.64 notes: ‘However, a general glorifi-
cation of certain conduct, without an intention for a specific crime to be 
committed, would be difficult to fit within the terms of sections 44 to 46 of 
the SCA 2007’.. 
ment and cyberstalking).84 We argue that this should not be done 
within the overarching bundle of dissimilar harms as suggest in the 
White Paper.  
Table 2 Harms with ‘less clear’ definition85
Group 2: 
Harms with ‘less clear’ 
definition
Status Provision/Comment
Cyberbullying and trolling Potentially criminal in some 
instances, but vaguely defined 
and with serious implications 
for free speech.
Potentially subset of com-
munication offences under 
section 2, 2A, 4, 4A of the 
Protection from Harassment 
Act 1997; Section 1 Malicious 
Communications Act 1988, 
but vague and depends on the 
definitions, which are vague 
and overlapping.86
Extremist content and 
activity
Criminal in many instances, but 
vaguely defined and difficult to 
apply uniformly.
Potentially Section 58 of the 
Terrorism Act 2000; Section 
3 of the Counter-Terrorism and 
Border Security Act 2019, but 
this is already covered by ter-
rorist content, so it is unclear 
why the extremist content is 
necessary as a “new harm.”
Coercive behavior Vaguely formulated. Potentially Section 2, 2A, 4, 
4A, Protection from Harass-
ment Act 1997; Section 1 Mali-
cious Communications Act 
1988, but vague and depends 
on the definition. This harm 
can also be potentially con-
fused with existing offences, 
such as harassment. Further 
offence is found in section 76 
of the Serious Crime Act 2015, 
but it only relates to domestic 
abuse cases.
Intimidation Potentially criminal, but also 
vaguely defined.
Section 4 and 4A, Protection 
from Harassment Act 1997, 
already illegal, and serious 
fear of violence offences in 
Section 4 and 4a of the Pub-
lic Order Act 1986, so unnec-
essary as a vaguely defined 
and subjective harm here. Its 
vagueness could mean that 
the harm may include legiti-
mate free speech.
Disinformation Vague, regulation of “fake news” 
is in progress.
Potentially covered by Section 
127(2)(a) or (b) of the Com-
munications Act 2003 and 
Section 1 Malicious Commu-
nications Act 1988, ongoing 
law reform in the area. Section 
51 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 
covers a bomb hoax; Hoaxes 
involving noxious substances 
or things are covered under 
section 114(2) of the Anti-Ter-
rorism, Crime and Security 
Act 2001; giving a false alarm 
of fire exists under section 
49(1) of the Fire and Rescue 
Services Act 2004; imperson-
ating a police officer -  section 
90 of the Police Act 1996; sec-
tion 106 of the Representation 
of the People Act 1983 offence 
to make or publish any false 
statement of fact in relation 
to the personal character of a 
candidate prior to or during an 
election.87
84 The Law Commission, ‘Abusive and Offensive Online Communications: 
A Scoping Report’, Law Com No 381, at: https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.
com/lawcom-prod-storage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2018/10/6_5039_LC_
Online_Comms_Report_FINAL_291018_WEB.pdf.
85 Online Harms White Paper (n 1)31. 
86 The Law Commission (n 84) ¶ 8.8. The Commission also rightly points 
out the issues with studies that analyze these phenomena, such as: ‘it is 
unclear whether the offending behavior being discussed would constitute a 
criminal offence under the criminal law, or whether the study is focused on 
generally unkind and unacceptable behavior, which falls short of an offence 
but is capable nevertheless of causing harm.’ (emphasis by the authors).
87 But there are no offences of creating or spreading fake news per se in 
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are suggesting that in order to achieve equivalent outcomes one 
needs tighter restrictions on online speech.
5 Free Speech
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights reflects a 
middle ground between unfettered speech under the First Amend-
ment of the US Constitution and the authoritarian approach to direct 
control of the media within a territory proposed by the Soviets.99 
Beyond the Convention, the European “project” is rooted in concepts 
of dignity and social justice. The first pillar of the Treaty of Maastricht 
on European Union refers to and of social protection and equality 
between men and women.100 The European Social Model is based on 
the concept of social cohesion. That individuals should not have to 
put up with promulgation of views deeply hurtful to themselves or 
their communities is a basic tenet of this approach to the needs of a 
pluralistic society. 
Article 10, Para 1 ECHR provides that the freedom of expression “shall 
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart informa-
tion and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless 
of frontiers.” The same wording appears almost verbatim in Article 
19, Para 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).101 Recent judgments from the ECtHR have highlighted State 
obligations to not only respect freedom of expression by refraining 
from interference and censorship, but also to ensure a favorable envi-
ronment for inclusive and pluralistic public debate.102 Thus, Article 10 
requires the adoption of “positive measures” to protect the “passive” 
element (right to be correctly informed) of free expression.103 There 
is a strong link between the two fundamental rights: an election 
process is “free” when, not only the electorate’s choice is determined 
by access to the widest possible range of proposals and ideas, but 
also if the election results do not risk being distorted or altered by the 
dissemination of false information.
Article 10(2) of the European Convention contains a list of the excep-
tions to the right of free expression contained in 10(1).104 Any limita-
tions to this must be not only proportional but achieve a legitimate 
aim for which the restriction is in place, in accordance with the law, 
and is necessary in a democratic society. European Union activities 
must respect the proportionality principle and, in areas that did not 
fall within its exclusive competence, the principle of subsidiarity105 
which encourages regulation at the local level, “as close to the citizen 
99 For a good overview of the debates of the foundations of free expression 
in international law, see Leiser M.R. (2019), ‘Regulating Computational 
Propaganda: Lessons from International Law’, Cambridge International Law 
Journal 8(2): 218-240.
100 Article 1 and 2 of the Treat of Maastrich on European Union; See 
also https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/fiches_tech-
niques/2013/010103/04A_FT(2013)010103_EN.pdf
101 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
16 December 1966
102 See Lingens v Austria (App No 9815/82) 8 July 1986; Janowski v Poland, 
Judgment (Merits), (App No 25716/94) 21 January 1999; Tammer v Estonia, 
(App. 41205/98), 6 February 2001; Janowski v Poland, Judgment (Merits), 
(App No 25716/94) 21 January 1999
103 J.F. Akandji-Kombe, Positive obligations under the European Convention 
on Human Rights. A guide to the implementation of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights—Human rights handbooks, No. 7. 2007, Strasbourg: 
Council of Europe. Available at: https://rm.coe.int/168007ff4d.  
104 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 
14, 4 November 1950
105 Article 5 of the EC Treaty; now Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) and Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiar-
ity and proportionality.
Table 3 Underage exposure to Legal Content91
Group 3:
Underage exposure to 
Legal Content
Status Comment
Children accessing pornog-
raphy
Service providers’ liability 
for making pornographic 
content available to persons 
under 18.
Digital Economy Act 2017, s 
14 requires providers to pre-
vent children from accessing 
pornography, under a threat of 
financial penalties (implemen-
tation has been delayed).92
Children accessing inappropri-
ate material
Vague, undefined, and 
problematic - who decides 
what is ‘inappropriate’ and 
who decides whether a child 
can access? What is the 
role of parents and educa-
tion in helping kids under-
stand what is appropriate 
for them to engage with? 
Do we really want parents 
determining what content a 
child accesses about sexual 
health is appropriate.
There are existing provisions 
preventing children from 
accessing pornographic, 
obscene and other prohibited 
materials, as noted above. 
‘Inappropriate’ as a category 
is extremely vague and open to 
interpretation, it is not certain 
whether it includes harmful 
online advertising, for example. 
It could also affect free speech 
of adults, children as well as 
other rights such as privacy.93
Under 13s using social media 
and under 18s using dating 
apps
Already the rule; however, 
rarely enforced; moral 
panic.
This is a question of adequate 
enforcement and age verifica-
tion, as noted above.94
Excessive screen time Moral panic. Evidence that the risk out-
weighs benefits have not been 
conclusive and the real harm 
is often overestimated by the 
media and advocacy groups.95
Even for “clear” harms, there is some dispute whether the definition 
is clear enough and to what extent these should even be criminalized 
(e.g. the definition of what defines “extreme pornography” is limited 
to the anus, genitals, breasts; necrophilia and bestiality, while exclud-
ing other injuries to the body).96 Some other harms are, of course, 
indisputably illegal, e.g. content related to child abuse. In the “less 
clearly” defined harms group,97 the scope of harm goes far beyond 
what is permitted by UK law in the offline world. 
Some harms are not illegal in the offline world and some are difficult 
to define without adversely affecting protected free speech (e.g. troll-
ing, violent content, intimidation or disinformation). The legislators 
have been avoiding to criminalize all trolling for instance, as a legal 
definition would potentially include legitimate free speech. Further-
more regulating “to achieve equivalent outcomes online and offline” 
requires a platform to determine the comparable offline offence. For 
example, Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 is far more 
restrictive to online speech than any offline equivalent.98 Thus, DCMS 
91 Online Harms White Paper (n 1) 31. 
92 The UK Government has struggled to find the appropriate way to imple-
ment the age verification system, so the implementation and enforcement 
of this provision has been delayed a few times already, see J Waterson 
and A Hern, ‘UK age-verification system for porn delayed by six months’, 
(The Guardian, 20 Jun 2019), at: https://www.theguardian.com/technolo-
gy/2019/jun/20/uks-porn-age-verification-system-to-be-delayed-indefinitely 
93 Regulation is not the silver bullet for all the risks associated with children 
using the Internet. The matrix of opportunities and risk associated with this 
is very complex, and researchers have identified various model to assess 
and address this risk, see e.g. Livingstone, Sonia, Mascheroni, Giovanna 
and Staksrud, Elisabeth, ‘European research on children’s internet use: as-
sessing the past and anticipating the future’, 2018 New Media and Society, 
20 (3). pp. 1103-1122; E Staksrud (2013), Children in the Online World: Risk, 
Regulation, Rights, Aldershot: Ashgate.
94 There are, however, many myths associated with this issue and the pic-
ture may not always be as presented in the media. See e.g. Livingstone, 
Mascheroni and Staksrud, ibid.
95 Livingstone, Sonia and Franklin, Keely (2018) Families with young children 
and ‘screen time’ advice. Journal of Health Visiting, 6 (9). pp. 434-439.
96 Section 63. Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. 
97 Online Harms White Paper (n 1) 31. 
98 Section 127 Communications Act 2003.
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the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every 
man. Subject to Article 10 (2), it is applicable not only to ‘information’ 
or ‘ideas’ that are favorably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a 
matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb 
the State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of 
that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there 
is no ‘democratic society’.”114
Will users be banned or have their speech curtailed for spreading fake 
news, just because they are misinformed or not well-educated? Is 
sharing a review of a violent Korean film or a death metal song with a 
bloody video ‘violent harmful content’? Does a platform need to take 
down Quentin Tarantino film previews too? The right to offend, shock 
and disturb is part of free expression. Speech should never be judged 
on its subjective effects on a user, but carefully weighed against 
clearly defined public interest and other human rights. The vague 
nature of harms as a group that is not illegal could be challenged 
under principles of the rule of law, proportionality and legal certain-
ty.115 This also contravenes the longstanding principle from Handyside 
v UK:116
Freedom of expression … is applicable not only to “information” or 
“ideas” that are [favorably] received or regarded as inoffensive or 
as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or 
disturb the State or any sector of the population.117
However, the Internet has brought a wholesale change in not only 
how information was disseminated, but also in respect of the actors 
doing the broadcasting. Users now generate most of the Internet’s 
content, with Article 10 engaging everything from low-level speech to 
news commentary to search engines display results.118 With a variety 
of technology available to hide user identities and the web’s architec-
ture empowering the user to not only speak without fear of social cen-
sure, but also automate and propagate their voice, the search for the 
right actor to regulate has frustrated regulators who have spent the 
last decade searching for a way to characterize platforms as publish-
ers to attach a regulatory code of content for the “harms” associated 
with social media platforms. 
As platforms have no general obligation to monitor content, the 
White Paper also fails to address how it intends to comply with the 
e-Commerce Directive and corresponding case law on platform liabili-
ty.119 The Online Harms White Paper claims, without explanation, that 
a ‘duty of care’ will somehow increase compliance: 
‘The new regulatory framework will increase the responsibility of 
114 Handyside v United Kingdom (5493/72) at ¶ 49.
115 UN, Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the 
Rule of Law at the National and International Levels (2012), ¶ 8 http://
www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=192; EU, Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU (2009), Article 49 (concerning the principles of legality 
and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties); European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, in particular 6(1), 7, 8(2), 9(2), 10(2) and 11(2).  
116 ECtHR (1976) Handyside v UK (5493/72).
117 Ibid  ¶ 49.
118 See e.g. Google Spain, SL, Google Inc v Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de 
Datos Case C-131/12 for search engine results; Sunday Times v United King-
dom (Application no. 6538/74), 26 April 1979 for news or Mosley v United 
Kingdom (Application no. 48009/08) 10 May 2011 for celebrity gossip as 
‘low level’ speech. 
119 EU, Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in 
particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on elec-
tronic commerce’), article 15; Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, 
compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) Case C-70/10; or the ECtHR case 
Delfi AS v. Estonia (Application no. 64569/09).
as possible.”106
While the European Court of Human Rights will generally not 
interfere with a Member State’s margin of appreciation to determine 
whether a particular measure is “necessary,” the ECtHR does not take 
kindly to measures that are not properly prescribed or satisfy the qual-
ity of law test, especially when it comes to expression.107 However, 
Strasbourg is only engaged in “…applying the principle of subsidiarity 
when national authorities have demonstrated in cases before the 
court that they have taken their obligations to secure Convention 
rights seriously.”108
What is it about free speech that irritates UK regulators? The Internet 
is a communications system without any front-end filter for user-gen-
erated content. It exists inside a legal system that has historically 
regulated different forms of non-digital speech. The framework for 
free expression as a fundamental right had to find a way to slot on top 
of an existing body of law that restricts speech in certain instances; 
for example, the longstanding law of copyright restricts the use of 
intellectual creation109 and defamation law generally restrains speech 
that lowers the standing of one’s reputation in the eyes of right-
minded members of society.110 Attributing responsibility (and in 
many cases, liability) was relatively straightforward when systems of 
information dissemination were limited to one-on-one or mediated 
communication.
Mass communication systems, like broadcasting and print journal-
ism, have fought to be subject to narrow controls.111 Media freedom in 
Europe has come about from hard battles that have established a set 
of legal principles and rules, alongside general duties and obliga-
tions.112 As a result, the media and the political class have a symbiotic 
relationship wherein the press might sit as a vital check on political 
power in one newspaper column and play the role of public relations 
conduit in another. The roles are enshrined in Convention Law and 
the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights and judge-
ments of the European Court of Justice.113
The question that requires a clearer answer is what is an “offense” 
and when/why people do take offense. This may include some of the 
following considerations: unwarranted critique of/interference with 
sense of personal/collective identity; political opportunism; taking 
offence seriously: questions of principle/practice. Further, this begs 
three questions: first, where are appropriate limits to be drawn? Sec-
ond, who should decide where these limits are? Third, is it legitimate 
ever to restrict freedom of expression to avoid the causing of offense 
to recipients of message? 
Starting point to answering these key questions should be the 
assertion of the importance of free speech: “Freedom of expression 
constitutes one of the essential foundations of such a society, one of 
106 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/7/the-principle-of-sub-
sidiarity (last accessed 18 September 2019). 
107 Sunday Times v United Kingdom (Application no. 6538/74), 26 April 1979
108 Handyside v United Kingdom (5493/72) at ¶ 49.
109 UK, Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 c. 48.
110 UK, Defamation Act 2013, c. 26.
111 See e.g. F S Siebert (1952), Freedom of the Press in England, 1476–1776: The 
Rise and Decline of Government Controls (Urbana:  University of Illinois 
Press) or J Rowbottom (2015), ‘Entick and Carrington, the Propaganda 
Wars and Liberty of the Press’ in A Tomkins and P Scott (eds), Entick v 
Carrington: 250 Years of the Rule of Law (Oxford, Hart).
112 J Rowbottom (2018), Media Law (Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing) 1-7.
113 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 
14, 4 November 1950; Sunday Times v United Kingdom (Application no. 
6538/74), 26 April 1979
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the users on a certain platform.
6 Meet Ofweb, the UK’s New Internet Overlord
The proposed model, placed on statutory footing, will be co-regula-
tion with initial responsibility handed to Ofcom, the United King-
dom’s broadcasting regulator, while a new regulator (provisionally 
called ‘Ofweb’) is established. 130  
The obvious questions that arises in a legal analysis is whether 
decisions made by Ofcom or Ofweb are subject to judicial review 
and what effects judicial review might have. In the UK, ‘parliamentary 
sovereignty’ ensures legislation cannot be reviewed by inferior courts; 
accordingly, this new regulatory system rooted in primary legislation 
cannot be subjected to judicial review. As the DCMS envisages that 
Ofcom’s responsibilities will eventually be handed to Ofweb, judicial 
review can only have a role in most limited of circumstances; for 
example, codes of conduct and enforcement decisions. Furthermore, 
one can only raise proceedings in the UK on one of four grounds – (a) 
illegality, (b) procedural unfairness, (c) irrationality, or (d) incompat-
ibility with human rights that are given effect by the Human Rights 
Act 1998. Therefore, the threshold for raising a judicial review against 
any specialist regulator in the UK is incredibly high. As a result of a 
failed petition for judicial review in RT v Ofcom131, one commentator 
was prompted to note:  “the judgment was an all-out win for Ofcom. 
It demonstrated yet again how difficult it is to succeed in a judicial 
challenge against the decision of a specialist regulator unless it has 
failed to comply with its own procedures or due process”.132
Furthermore, judicial review should not be seen as a viable appeals 
process for decisions. In fact, one cannot apply to the courts if there 
is an open and valid appeals process that could have been followed, 
nor can judicial review overturn an earlier decision; it can only 
determine whether that decisions were illegal, improper, or irrational. 
Judicial review can only nullify the act (i.e. it never actually happened) 
rather than overturning it. A regulator like Ofweb would then be free 
to make the same exact decision having corrected for the earlier, for 
example, procedural error. 
Admittingly, putting platform regulation on a co-regulatory framework 
has its benefits (e.g. stronger legitimacy than self-regulation, based 
on powers given by the Parliament, expertise, principle-based regula-
tion, flexibility, cooperation with the industry),133 yet there is a danger 
in Ofweb uncritically replicating the existing model of broadcast 
regulation, which has a very different historical rationale and justifi-
cation, onto the Internet. Broadcast regulation affects entities who 
have access to scarce resources, such as spectrum,134 who produce 
and distribute content at a large scale, and exercise editorial control 
with little user-created and/or generated content.135 The Americans 
have also rejected this approach. In ACLU v Reno,136 the US Supreme 
Court famously rejected the argument that regulating the Internet was 
130 Online Harms White Paper (n 1) ¶ 5.15.
131 https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/RT-v-Ofcom-ap-
proved-judgment-27.3.20.pdf.
132 https://smab.co.uk/first-court-decision-ofcom-impartiality.
133 See generally Christopher T. Marsden, ‘Internet Co-Regulation and Consti-
tutionalism: Towards a More Nuanced View’ (August 29, 2011). Available 
at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1973328 or Marsden (2011), Internet 
Co-Regulation: European Law, Regulatory Governance and Legitimacy in 
Cyberspace (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press).                                           
134 The radio spectrum is the part of the electromagnetic spectrum, widely 
used in modern technology, particularly in telecommunications and broad-
casting. Examples of its use include TV, radio, mobile internet etc. see 
Wikipedia, Radio spectrum, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radio_spectrum
135 Rowbottom (n 112) 280-288.
136 Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
online services in a way that is compatible with the EU’s e-Com-
merce Directive, which limits their liability for illegal content until 
they have knowledge of its existence, and have failed to remove it 
from their services in good time’.120
However, ‘intermediary liability’ is not merely a creation of the e-com-
merce Directive. It may have been established by the e-Commerce 
Directive,121 but it was implemented into UK law through the e-Com-
merce Regulations122 and developed by subsequent case law in both 
the CJEU and UK Courts.123 
This will have implications on the status of the law post brexit as well. 
Under Section 2 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, the 
directives are not ‘retained EU law’, yet the domestic legislation that 
gives a directive effect in national law remains: 
‘Whereas other provisions of the e-Commerce Directive were 
implemented by the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regu-
lations 2002, article 15 was not specifically implemented through 
UK domestic legislation. Under section 2 of the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Act 2018 directives are not in themselves “retained 
EU law”, only the domestic legislation made to implement them. 
However, under section 4 of the Act any prior obligations or 
restrictions of EU law which are “recognised and available in 
domestic law” will continue after Brexit. As article 15 has been 
recognised by domestic courts, including the Supreme Court in 
Cartier International AG and others v British Telecommunications 
Plc,  it is likely to be considered retained law, but uncertainty 
may remain until the matter is tested by the courts’124 [Emphasis 
Added]
The Directive provides a safe harbor for internet “hosts” (most of 
the companies the Government aims to regulate would fit into this 
category, including social media) and the protection from liability 
for illegal content stored on their platforms, provided that they do 
not have the actual knowledge about this content, and that they act 
promptly upon obtaining this knowledge.125 The Directive prohibits 
the general monitoring of Internet users for the purpose of detecting 
such content.126 There is extensive CJEU case law on the matter127 
as well as the related ECtHR jurisprudence on Articles 8 and 10 of 
the ECHR and the liability of Internet platforms.128 The Government 
claims the new regime will be compatible with the Directive, but given 
the scope and requirements of duty of care, this is uncertain.129 The 
prohibition of general monitoring will almost certainly have to be 
violated; it would be practically impossible to identify and remove all 
the potentially “harmful” content without monitoring activities of all 
120 Ibid ¶ 41.
121 Directive 2000/31/EC.
122 Regulations 17, 18, and 19 of the E-Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 
2002 SI 2002/2013.
123 In the UK, for example, Godfrey v Demon Internet Service [1999] EWHC 244 
(QB).
124 House of Lords Communications Committee Report (n 18) 185.
125 EU, Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in par-
ticular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic 
commerce’), article 14.
126 Ibid, article 15.
127 For example, Scarlet Extended SA v Societe Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs 
et Editeurs SCRL (SABAM) (C-70/10) [2011] E.C.R. I-11959 (24 November 
2011).
128 Delfi AS v. Estonia (Application no. 64569/09); Tamiz v the United Kingdom 
(Application no. 3877/14) ECHR (12 October 2017); Magyar Jeti Zrt v. Hun-
gary (Application no. 11257/16), 4 December 2018.
129 For example, Tamiz v the United Kingdom (Application no. 3877/14) [2017] 
ECHR (12 October 2017).
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regulate the Internet, the intricacy of meeting “economically effec-
tive and socially just”145 targets means that there is no uniformly 
accepted regulatory technique for digital technologies.146 Rather, 
numerous possibilities exist within the categories of self-regulation, 
state regulation and “multi stakeholder co-regulation.”147 Each option 
carries advantages and disadvantages,148 satisfying and undermining 
different notions of legitimacy,149 such that implementation is fraught 
and “cynicism is at least partly justified.”150
Asking a public authority to make specific rules can result in regu-
latory capture or a climate of resistance between the regulated and 
regulators and an impediment to higher performance.151 Moreover, 
the strong intervention of public authority who represent the overall 
interests of the state may cause undue influence on the assessment 
through external factors. Both political and economic considerations 
can damage the advantages associated with the top-down model of 
platform regulation.  There is also the risk of the most restrictive con-
tent laws becoming the norm across multiple platforms, regardless of 
the audience and user demographics. Schultz calls this the “slowest 
ship in the convoy problem”– the universal availability of information 
on the Internet might produce universal effects.152 All platforms would 
have to comply with the most restrictive (i.e. the “slowest ship”) 
standard.
7 Recommendations
Placing a duty of care on platforms for user-generated content that 
may cause harm will chill free expression and conflates the well-es-
tablished common and statutory duty of care with clear duties and 
actual injuries. The least we could do is refer to the “duty” as “the 
duty to comply with existing regulation,” or just maintain general 
terms of legal and regulatory obligations and duties. The government 
needs to reacquaint itself with the historical rationales for regulat-
ing broadcast (initially unregulated with increasing regulation amid 
scarce resources) or the press (initially heavily regulated with gradual 
deregulation and strengthening of media freedom).153
Whilst it is clear that there are problems with online platforms, their 
power and different harms that arise as a consequence,154 most of the 
identified harms in the White Paper could be remedied with proper 
co-regulation of actors operating online, and enhanced obligations 
to cooperate with law enforcement over a variety of existing forms of 
145 Brown, I., & Marsden, C. T. (2013). Regulating code: Good governance and 
better regulation in the information age. (Boston: MIT Press) ix; See also 
Orla Lynskey (2015), The Foundations of EU Data Protection Law (Oxford: 
OUP) at Page 47.
146 Brown & Marsden (n 145) 1; See also Terry Flew (2018), ‘Technology and 
Trust: The Challenge of Regulating Digital Platforms’ (Korean Association 
for Broadcasting and Telecommunications Studies) 9-11.
147 Ibid at Page 2. 
148 Ibid at Page 2-3.
149 Black, J. (2008). Constructing and contesting legitimacy and accountability 
in polycentric regulatory regimes. Regulation & governance, 2(2), 137-164 at 
Page 145.
150 Brown & Marsden (n 145) 3.
151 Baldwin R, Cave M, Lodge M. (2012) Understanding regulation: theory, strat-
egy, and practice. (Oxford University Press on Demand)108-110.
152 Schultz, T. (2008). Carving up the Internet: jurisdiction, legal orders, and 
the private/public international law interface. European Journal of Interna-
tional Law, 19(4), 799-839 at 813 citing Zittrain, ‘ Be Careful What You Ask 
For: Reconciling a Global Internet and Local Law’, in A. Thierer and C.W. 
Crews (eds) (2013), Who Rules the Net? Internet Governance and Jurisdiction 
(Cato Institute) 17.
153 Rowbottom (n 153) 2 -5, 256 – 288. 
154 As the EU recognises and addresses in the ongoing attempt to reform plat-
form liability, inter alia. See e.g. European Commission, ‘Shaping Europe’s 
digital future’ (COM (2020)0067), 19 February 2020.
justified on grounds that broadcasting platforms are heavily regulated 
for content.137 The Court stated that regulating content was permit-
ted in broadcasting contexts because viewers had little control over 
what they were exposed to; however, users have to take a series of 
affirmative action to access the online content they want to see.138 In 
addition to this, users also produce different types of content in ways 
unimaginable for broadcast. 
In a case before the European Court of Human Rights, the Court 
recognized the difficulty applying broadcasting codes to Internet 
platforms:
It is true that the Internet is an information and communica-
tion tool particularly distinct from the printed media, especially 
as regards the capacity to store and transmit information. The 
electronic network, serving billions of users worldwide, is not 
and potentially will never be subject to the same regulations and 
control.139 
The Court also recognizes that the risk of harm online is different to 
that of broadcast and press media. 
The risk of harm posed by content and communications on the 
Internet to the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and free-
doms, particularly the right to respect for private life, is certainly 
higher than that posed by the press. Therefore, the policies govern-
ing reproduction of material from the printed media and the Inter-
net may differ. The latter undeniably have to be adjusted according 
to the technology’s specific features in order to secure the protec-
tion and promotion of the rights and freedoms concerned.140
Note the Court’s two concerns about the risk of harm by content 
and communications to first, the interference with other rights; and, 
second, that technology-specific features require adjustments to 
“secure the protection and promotion of the rights and freedoms 
concerned.”141
Regulation over broadcasting has a much smaller impact than on 
individual speech. There are no scarce resources; however, there is 
peer-to-peer sharing, user-generated content, and individually cre-
ated, but non-filtered speech. Furthermore, the press’ self-regulatory 
model is a result of a long and exhausting struggle against historically 
regulated sectors like the press.142 On the other hand, the Internet 
was founded on - and still largely embraces - the libertarian principle 
of openness.143 Chapter Six of the House of Lords Communications 
Committee report suggests a new Parliamentary Joint Committee to 
ensure the regulator does not act on their own.144 If implemented, 
there would be a tripartite regulatory relationship between ‘Ofweb’ 
(the regulator), the Government via the Cabinet Office and Parlia-
ment via a new Joint Committee. This is not independence; on the 
contrary, it is government using platforms as proxies to control the 
Internet.
Beyond the inappropriateness of using broadcasting’s model to 
137 Ibid at 845, 870.
138 Idem at 854.
139 ECtHR, Judgment of 5 May 2011, Case of Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and 
Shtekel v Ukraine, (Application No. 33014/05) at ¶  ;See also Judgment of 
16 June 2015, Case of Delfi AS v Estonia (Application no. 64569/09).
140 Editorial Board at ¶ 36 (emphasis added).
141 Editorial Board at ¶ 63.
142 Rowbottom (n 111).
143 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, avail-
able at: https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence.
144 House of Lords Communications Committee (n 18) chapter 6. 
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law. The regulatory framework must be accessible: users “must be 
given an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal 
rules applicable to a given case.”165  Secondly, users must be able to 
moderate their behavior in line with what is reasonably foreseeable.166  
Users “must be able - if need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, 
to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences 
which a given action may entail.”167 The White Paper’s proposed 
framework is vague and insufficient and lacks the clarity to “give 
individuals an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which 
and the conditions on which the authorities are empowered to resort” 
to any such measures.168 
The White Paper falls short by not properly considering alternatives 
to its proposed measures. We point out some alternatives below 
with the purpose of demonstrating that alternative recommendations 
would be conceivable, rather than attempting to develop these fully. 
1. Reform Intermediary liability. An alternative way to respond to the 
“online harms” identified in the White Paper is reformation of the 
liability provisions of the e-Commerce Directive, in line with the 
Regulations adopted in the last mandate of the European Com-
mission.  The general principle of a harmonized, graduated, and 
conditional exemption continues to be needed as a foundational 
principle of the Internet. The principle, however, needs to be 
updated and reinforced to reflect the nature of the services in use 
today. This could mean that the notions of mere conduit, caching 
and hosting service could be expanded to explicitly include other 
services. In some instances, this can amount to codifying existing 
case law (e.g. for search engines or Wi-Fi hotspots), while in other 
cases a clarification of its application to collaborative economy 
services, cloud services, content delivery networks, domain name 
services, etc. is necessary. Building on concepts like editorial 
responsibility169, actual knowledge170 and degree of control171, 
the concept of active/passive hosts should be replaced by more 
appropriate concepts that reflect the technical reality of today’s 
services.172 
2. General monitoring and automated filtering. While the prohibi-
tion of general monitoring obligations should be maintained as 
another foundational cornerstone of Internet regulation, specific 
165 ECtHR The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (No. 1), 6538/74, 26 April 
1979 at ¶  49.
166 Rekvényi v Hungary, 25390/94, 20 May 1999, At ¶ 34f.
167 ECtHR The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (No. 1), 6538/74, 26 April 
1979 at ¶  49.
168 Ibid, at  at ¶ 49; See also Malone v United Kingdom Application 
no. 8691/79, 2 August 1984 at [67]. 
169 For example, See The New Definitions Of “Audiovisual Media Service” (Ar-
ticle (1)(a)(i)) and “Video-Sharing Platform Service” (Article (1)(b)(aa) and 
Article 1(D)(Bb) of Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 14 November 2018 amending Directive 2010/13/
EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation 
or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of 
audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) in view 
of changing market realities.
170 Note 123, supra. 
171 L’Oreal v eBay Case C324/09, 12 July 2011 at ¶ 116, 123, 145; See also Article 
14(2), e-Commerce Directive
172 For some other approaches see, for instance: C. Angelopoulos C. and 
S. Smet, ‘Notice-and-fair-balance: how to reach a compromise between 
fundamental rights in European intermediary liability’, (2016) Journal of 
Media Law, 8(2); S. Stalla-Bourdillon (2017), ‘Internet Intermediaries as 
Responsible Actors? Why It Is Time to Rethink the Ecommerce Directive 
as Well’, in Taddeo M., Floridi L. (eds), The Responsibilities of Online Service 
Providers. Law, Governance and Technology Series, vol 31. (Heidelberg etc: 
Springer).
criminal speech and behavior. Because of the extent of the impact of 
regulation on the digital rights of users, judicial oversight is crucial, 
and any regulator should be independent with pathways for judicial 
remedies and reviews. Furthermore, it is insufficient to base platform 
regulation on a handful of user submissions and surveys. Although 
Ofcom’s annual survey is widely cited throughout, albeit quite selec-
tively, any additional harms subject to further regulation need to be 
based on clear and unambiguous evidence.155 As our analysis shows, 
the concept of “online harms” is vague and it should be dropped 
entirely. Any additional harm criminalized in the future needs to be 
clearly defined, well evidenced and regulated in the public interest.
Additionally, it is suggested that companies do not rely on technology 
solely, but human oversight should also be a requirement wherever 
there are takedown procedures in place. Automated systems and AI 
are not reliable enough to be used alone, as we have seen in the case 
of the YouTube Content ID system156 and the likelihood of errors.157 
Speech assessment includes qualitative questions on whether con-
tent should be treated differently to information offline for every indi-
vidual user (the parity principle, for example).158 For this to happen, the 
platform will need to understand the context of exchanges between 
every user on a platform and how people communicate offline with 
one another.159 Different platforms have different social norms and 
communication practices and this should be respected (e.g. it is not 
realistic to expect the same language on 4Chan, Reddit, and Mums-
net).
Using technology to search for fake news is potentially problematic 
with false positives potential affecting media pluralism.160 In Jersild 
v Denmark,161 the court stated that “the methods of objective and 
balanced reporting may vary considerably, depending among other 
things on the media in question.”162  Second, Article 10 ECHR “pro-
tects not only the substance of the ideas and information expressed, 
but also the form in which they are conveyed.”163 The observation that 
“the methods of objective and balanced reporting may vary consider-
ably’’164 takes on increased importance in contemporary times. In the 
current “post-truth” era, fake news, misinformation and disinforma-
tion are widely generated and disseminated by a range of actors (and 
algorithmic techniques) and they compete fiercely with one another 
for the public’s attention and acceptance.
More generally, the White Paper also lacks the clarity necessary in 
155 For a good example of how evidence submitted to the Committee has 
been bastardized to make a political point, see Goldman, Eric, The U.K. 
Online Harms White Paper and the Internet’s Cable-ized Future (2019). 
Ohio State Tech. L.J., Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3438530 at Page 2.  
156 YouTube, ‘How Content ID Works’ https://support.google.com/youtube/
answer/2797370?hl=en; J Bailey, ‘YouTube Beta Testing Content ID For 
Everyone’ (Plagiarism Today, 2 May 2018) https://www.plagiarismtoday.
com/2018/05/02/youtube-beta-testing-content-id-for-everyone/.
157 J M Urban, J Karaganis, and B Schofield,‘Notice and Takedown in Everyday 
Practice’, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2755628. http://dx.doi.
org/10.2139/ssrn.2755628.
158 Online Harms White Paper (n 1)    
159 This is virtually impossible, see Banerjee, S., Chua, A. Y., & Kim, J. J. (2017). 
Don’t be deceived: Using linguistic analysis to learn how to discern online 
review authenticity. Journal of the Association for Information Science and 
Technology, 68(6), 1525-1538.
160 Heins, M., & Beckles, T. (2005). Will fair use survive? Free expression in the 
age of copyright control. Marjorie Heins.
161 Jersild v Denmark, ECtHR 23 September 1994 (GC), ECLI:CE:ECHR:1994:-
0923JUD001589089, Series A no. 298.  
162 Ibid ¶ 31.
163 ECtHR, Autronic AG v Switzerland (1990) 12 EHRR 485, [47]
164 Bladet Tromso and Stensaas v Norway, 20 May 1999, [59].
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content moderation on its site.177
In what feels like ancient history, the Special Rapporteur on the pro-
motion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expres-
sion, David Kaye, warned in 2011 against the adverse effects that 
disproportionate regulation of content might have on free speech.178 
To address this, he recommends:
States should only seek to restrict content pursuant to an order by 
an independent and impartial judicial authority, and in accord-
ance with due process and standards of legality, necessity and 
legitimacy. States should refrain from imposing disproportionate 
sanctions, whether heavy fines or imprisonment, on Internet 
intermediaries, given their significant chilling effect on freedom of 
expression.179
Furthermore, there is little evidence that the data published in the 
Online Harms White Paper or the House of Lords Communications 
Committee will change anyone’s opinion or behavior. Opinion on 
platform regulation will always remain divided along deeply held 
beliefs about the constitutional merits of criminal prohibitions in 
areas like hate speech and the role of private actors in content regula-
tion. Rather than assuming every view different from our own results 
in harm and place a burden on online services to remove them, we 
need to develop techniques and strategies for defeating ideology 
through competition in the marketplace of ideas. With so many spe-
cial interests competing with each other for the attention of lawmak-
ers, each with their own agenda in protecting identifiable stakehold-
ers, regulation should be forward-thinking and dynamic, and protect 
the principles of free expression and media pluralism, rather than 
take action to inhibit and control. In hindsight, it is quite surprising 
that there was not more emphasis on enhanced cooperation between 
platforms and law enforcement.
The Internet is for expression – it is for argument, emotion, anger, 
purchasing, love, sex, and sharing. Expression is its bread and but-
ter. All of the above, of course, come with negative consequences. 
Arguments can turn into violence, emotions can run high and lead to 
regret, anger can cause permanent damage, love can turn to heart-
break, sex can lead to objectification and pain, and sharing can be 
a violation of someone else’s rights. We are already well-equipped 
to deal with this through different forms of online offences such as 
harassment, revenge porn and other communication offences. Some 
of these, as suggested by the Law Commission, should be reviewed 
and consolidated,180 but this will be dealt with through criminal law 
reforms, and not the vaguely imposed duty of care that threatens 
fundamental rights online.  Behind all of this is the harm associated 
with regulatory capture, the protectionist mindset of ‘something must 
be done,’ and the problem of regulating the wrong actors.
Imposing a duty of care on platforms inadvertently creates a frame-
work for crushing dissent, plurality, diversity, “British values,”181 and 
177 Establishing Structure and Governance for an Independent Oversight 
Board, Available at https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/09/over-
sight-board-structure (last accessed 19 September 2019). 
178 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of 
the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 06 April 2019, available at: 
https://documents-dds- ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G18/096/72/PDF/
G1809672.pdf
179 Ibid 19.
180 Note 76, Supra 328- 334.
181 UK, Department for Education, Promoting fundamental British values as 
part of SMSC in schools, Departmental advice for maintained schools, 
November 2014, at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/380595/SMSC_Guidance_
provisions governing algorithms for automated filtering technolo-
gies - where these are used - should be considered, to provide the 
necessary transparency and accountability of automated content 
moderation systems.
3. Regulating content moderation. Uniform rules for the removal 
of illegal content like illegal hate speech should be made binding 
across the EU. Replacing notice-and-takedown with notice-and-
action rules could be tailored to the types of services, e.g. whether 
the service is a social network, a mere conduit, or a collaborative 
economy service, and where necessary to the types of content in 
question, while maintaining the maximum simplicity of rules. The 
feasibility of introducing thresholds could be examined in this con-
text, taking due account of the size and nature of the service pro-
vider and of the nature of the potential obligations to be imposed 
on them. Building on the Recommendation on Illegal Content,173 
binding transparency obligations would also be at the heart of a 
more effective accountability framework for content moderation 
at scale and would complement recently adopted rules under the 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive174 or the modernization of the 
EU copyright rules.175 Increasing transparency for algorithmic rec-
ommendation systems of public relevance like social media news 
feeds should be examined. At the same time, these rules should 
prohibit allowing Member States to impose parallel transparency 
obligations at national level, providing for a simple set of rules that 
comply with the Manila principles176 on content moderation and 
intermediary liability in the European Union.
8 Conclusions: Broad and Flawed
The Internet is not a “safe space,” nor was it intended to be. Without 
a doubt, the Internet is a complicated space; however, it also makes 
us look at humankind’s most unsavory characteristics in a way never 
imagined before. Accordingly, we should look at platforms as a 
blessing, not a burden. How else could we know that so many people 
think like us at the same time as hold such divergent, even abhorrent 
views? Yet the White Paper goes beyond turning the Internet into a 
virtual soft play area where everyone has to watch what they say, what 
they do, and how they act. It burdens the platform with a duty of care 
to police the speech of its patrons, under the threat of sanctions for 
what might be offensive or intimidating and might cause harm. This 
is a prime example of the “chilling effects” of content moderation. 
Furthermore, platforms have undertaken significant self-regulatory 
responses to mitigate the threat of co-regulation. For example, 
Facebook launched an Independent Oversight Board and charter for 
173 Commission Recommendation on measures to effectively tackle illegal 
content online, Commission Recommendation of 1.3.2018 on measures 
to effectively tackle illegal content online (C(2018) 1177 final), Available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/commission-recom-
mendation-measures-effectively-tackle-illegal-content-online, (last accessed 
19 September 2019). 
174 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 
March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provi-
sion of audiovisual media services.
175 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market 
and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC
176 Manila Principles on Intermediary Liability Best Practices Guidelines for 
Limiting Intermediary Liability for Content to Promote Freedom of Expres-
sion and Innovation, Available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-mar-
ket/en/news/commission-recommendation-measures-effectively-tackle-il-
legal-content-online (last accessed 19 September 2019).
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ultimately, free speech. Populism, is, by its very definition,182 wedded 
to the preservation of the status quo. That said, it is surely a wonder-
ful thing that, for all its faults, there is at least one remaining space in 
our culture where words still matter and where promises made in the 
form of written undertakings (“laws”) have consequences. However, 
for the Internet, the trick is getting the law right. A society that stops 
being governed by the authority and rule of law and reverts to that 
of the “populist,” the priest, or “the people” is not a place where 
freedom, openness and democracy will long survive. It seems a long 
way from Frank La Rue, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 2011 
Report to the UN183 when he stated: 
The Special Rapporteur believes that censorship measures should 
never be delegated to a private entity, and that no one should 
be held liable for content on the Internet of which they are not 
the author. Indeed, no State should use or force intermediaries 
to undertake censorship on its behalf.184 Of concern,  Subject to 
abuse by state and private entities; Risk of liability causes interme-
diary to err on the side of taking content down; Lack of transpar-
ency on decision making practices obscures discriminatory prac-
tices or political pressure affecting their decisions; and companies 
shouldn’t be making the assessment of legality of content.185
More recently, Catalina Botero Marino strongly endorsed transpar-
ency in her 2013 report, stating: 
[w]ith respect to the duty of transparency, intermediaries should 
have sufficient protection to disclose the requests received from 
government agencies or other legally authorized actors who 
infringe upon users’ rights to freedom of expression or privacy. It 
is good practice, in this respect, for companies to regularly publish 
transparency reports in which they disclose at least the number 
and type of the request that could lead to the restrictions to users’ 
rights to freedom of expression or privacy.186
A flat-earther that has been called an idiot or an imbecile could have 
a claim of “abuse” and/or intimidation. Empowering users might be 
a noble objective, but that requires empowering the right users and 
educating everyone.
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182 David Molloy, What is populism, and what does the term actually mean?, 
(BBC News, 6 March 2018), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-43301423.
183 Frank La Rue, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and pro-
tection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression Human Rights 
Council, Seventeenth session, Agenda item 3, Promotion and protection 
of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, 
including the right to development, Available at https://www2.ohchr.
org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf (last 
accessed 11 September 2019). 
184 Ibid ¶ 43. 
185 Ibid ¶ 42. 
186 IACHR Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression (OSR-
FE), Freedom of Expression and the Internet, (Dec. 31, 2013), Available at 
https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/docs/reports/2014_04_08_in-
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